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Abstract
The intended meaning of intuitionistic logic is explained by the Brouwer Heyting 
Kolmogorov BHK provability semantics which informally denes intuitionistic
truth as provability and species the intuitionistic connectives via operations on
proofs The problem of nding an adequate formalization of the provability seman 
tics and establishing the completeness of the intuitionistic logic Int was rst raised
by Godel in  This question turned out to be a part of the more general prob 
lem of the intended realization for Godel	s modal logic of provability S  which was
open since  In this tutorial talk we present a provability realization of Int and
S  that solves both of these problems We describe the logic of explicit provability
LP with the atoms 
t is a proof of F and establish that every theorem of S  ad 
mits a reading in LP as the statement about operations on proofs Moreover both
S  and Int are shown to be complete with respect to this realization In addition
LP subsumes the   calculus modal   calculus combinatory logic and provides a
uniform provability realization of modality and   terms
  Introduction
In   A Heyting suggested the axiom system Int for intuitionistic logic
	
 
 In   
 Heyting and Kolmogorov made Brouwers denition of in

tuitionistic truth explicit though informal by introducing what is now known
as Brouwer Heyting Kolmogorov BHK semantics and is widely recognized as
 
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the intended semantics of intuitionistic logic BHK semantics gives an infor

mal explanation of the truth of intuitionistic connectives A statement is true
if it has a proof and a proof of a logically compound statement is given in
terms of the proofs of its components The description uses the unexplained
primitive notions of proof and construction
 
a proof of a proposition A B consists of a proof of A and a proof of B
 
a proof of AB is given by presenting either a proof of A or a proof of B
 
a proof of AB is a construction which given a proof of A returns a proof
of B
 
absurdity  is a proposition which has no proof and a proof of A is a
construction which given a proof of A would return a proof of 
The natural problem of nding an adequate formalization of the provability
semantics and establishing the completeness of the intuitionistic logic Int with
respect to this semantics remained open until recently despite a long history
of studies in this area
Note that the standard realizability semantics for Int is not faithful since
there are realizable formulas that are not derivable in Int First of all fol

lowing Kleene  	 we distinguish between intuitionistic and classical un

derstanding of realizability semantics for intuitionistic theories Intuitionistic
realizability enjoys some nice completeness properties but does not provide an
independent semantics for Int For example as follows from   a formula
F is provable in intuitionistic predicate logic i all arithmetical instances of F
are provably realizable in a certain extensionHA

of intuitionistic arithmetic
Such a result relates Int with a formal theory based on the same Int and thus
is not intended to give an independent semantics for the latter On the other
hand classical realizabilities Kleene realizability function realizability modi

ed realizability Medvedevs calculus of nite problems and its variants	 give
conditions necessary but not sucient for Int
Natural deduction proofs for Int can be transliterated by the Curry

Howard isomorphism into the language of typed  
terms The inductive de

nition of the Curry
Howard isomorphism goes along the lines of BHK clauses
where  
terms play the role of BHK proofs Though very important for es

tablishing connections between derivationsformulas of Int and termstypes
in  
calculus the Curry
Howard presentation does not give an independent
semantical characterization for Int Indeed under this presentation the real

ization of a sentence is modulo to isomorphism a derivation of this sentence
in the same Int Loosely speaking from the BHK semantics perspective the
Curry
Howard isomorphism provides a trivial solution a formula F is true
by denition if F is derivable in Int
Despite strong similarities between Heytings and Kolmogorovs descrip

tions of the provability semantics for Int their approaches had fundamentally
dierent objectives Heyting explained propositional intuitionistic logic Int
in terms of the intuitionistic understanding of constructions and proofs His

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semantics gives a partial analysis of the intuitionistic meaning of a statement
and does not intend to provide a foundation for Int independent of the intu

itionistic assumptions Kolmogorov in    intended to interpret Int on the
basis of the usual mathematical notion of problem solution eg proof	 and
thus to provide a denition of intuitionistic logic within classical mathematics
For the purposes of formalization of BHK semantics it is important to
distinguish between classical and intuitionistic interpretations of BHK clauses
We suggest the name classical BHK semantics for the former and intuitionistic
BHK semantics for the latter Thus Kolmogorovs reading of Int as the logic
of problem solutions may be considered classical BHK semantics
We demonstrate that classical BHK semantics in turn admits an exact
mathematical formalization which indeed provides an adequate realization of
Int on the basis of the usual classical notion of proof
Godel in   introduced the modal logic of provability and explicitly de

ned Int in this logic Godels provability logic has the modal axioms and
rules  FF   FG	  F G	  F  F  F   F necessitation
rule	 admits all axioms and rules of classical logic and therefore coincides
with the classical modal logic S  Godel considered the translation tF of an
intuitionistic formula F into the classical modal language box each subfor

mula of F Godel established that
Int  F  S   tF
providing an exact reading of Int formulas as statements about provability in
classical mathematics He conjectured that the inverse  also holds This
conjecture was eventually established in  
In one of his lectures  in   rst published in   see also  	
Godel sketched an explicit version of S 

with the basic proposition t is
a proof of F Although this sketch does not contain exact denitions it
shows the way to explain the reexivity principle for provability logic which
was the major diculty in S  Godels proposal generalized the problem of
formalization of classical BHK semantics for Int to the problem of building
an explicit provability logic presumably the former was derivable from the
latter The questions about an appropriate language and a complete set of
axioms for explicit provability logic as well as the question about its ability
to realize Int and S  had remained open
Kreisel in    apparently without knowledge of 	 developed a for

mal theory of constructions with a basic predicate like Godels t is a proof
of F but with only partial success The system of conditions from   
even for the propositional language turned out to be inconsistent  Goodman
in  suggested a way to x this gap which however led the resulting real

izability away from the original BHK design To the best of our knowledge

Godels sketch was rather clear about the propositional principles of explicit provability
logic It also mentioned possible principles involving the rst order quantiers but was not
specic on this matter We consider the propositional part of Godels sketch only

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completeness of Int with respect to this Kreisel
Goodman realizability has
not been established cf   	
 About this talk
In this tutorial talk we present a recent solutions in     cf also a
survey 	 of the problems discussed above
  We give the exact intended semantics and nd a complete axiom system
for the explicit provability logic sketched by Godel in 	 We demonstrate
that one more operation should be added to Godels sketch of the explicit
provability logic  	 in order to enable it to emulate the whole of S  We
call the resulting system the Logic of Proofs LP	
 We nd an adequate provability realization of the Godel provability logic
SL We establish that LP realizes all of S  by assigning proof terms to the
modalities in every S 
derivation This gives an adequate provability model
for S  along the lines of Godels suggestion in 
 We formalize the classical BHK semantics for Int and establish the com 
pleteness of intuitionistic logic with respect to this realizability	 We consider
two realizations of Int in LP The rst one is dened by Godels translation
of intuitionistic formulas into modal language box all subformulas with the
subsequent realization in LP The second one is the McKinsey
Tarski trans

lation box all atoms and implications	 followed by the realization in LP
Each of those two semantics is established to be adequate for intuitionistic
propositional logic This conrms Kolmogorovs assumption of   that in

tuitionistic logic Int coincides with the calculus of solutions to problems in
classical mathematics LP may be considered as the unied logical technique
dealing with two types of objects statements and problems meant by Kol

mogorov in      	 This also achieves the original objective of Godel
 	 to dene Int via the classical notion of proof
 We demonstrate that LP subsumes modal   calculus thus providing a
uniform provability realization of modality and   terms LP may be consid

ered as a generalization of combinatory logic capable of iterating the type
assignment  In particular LP can express the propositions of the form
t  s  F 	 which are outside the scope of the usual combinatory logic LP
naturally contains the dened abstraction operator  

x which is an extension
of the dened  
abstraction operator  

x in combinatory logic cf 	 This
generalizes the Curry
Howard presentation of intuitionistic proofs as typed
 
terms Moreover through realizations in LP both modality and  
terms re

ceive a uniform provability semantics and thus may be treated as the objects
of the same nature namely proof polynomials

Artemov
 Logic of Proofs
Denition  The language of Logic of Proofs LP	 contains
 
the usual language of classical propositional logic
 
proof variables x

     x
n
    proof constants a

     a
n
   
 
function symbols monadic  binary  and 
 
operator symbol of the type term 
 formula
Terms are dened by the grammar
p  x
i
j a
i
j p j p

 p

j p

 p

We call these terms proof polynomials and denote them by prst   Using
t to stand for any term and S for any propositional letter the formulas are
dened by the grammar
  S j 



j 

 

j 



j  j t 
The intended semantics for p F is p is a proof of F was made formal in
  and 
Denition  The system LP Axioms
A	 Finite set of axiom schemes of classical propositional logic in the
language of LP
A	 t F  F verication
A	 t  F  G	  s F  ts	 G	 application
A	 t F  t  t F 	 proof checker
A	 s F  st	 F  t F  st	 F choice
Rules of inference
R	
F  G F
G modus ponens	
R	

c A if A is an axiom A  A and c a proof
constant axiom necessitation	
A Constant Specication CS is a nite set of formulas c

 A

     c
n
 A
n
such that c
i
is a constant and A
i
an axiom A  A Each derivation in
LP naturally generates the CS consisting of all formulas introduced in this
derivation by the axiom necessitation rule
Remark  Proof constants inLP stand for proofs of simple facts namely
propositional axioms and axioms A  A In a way the proof constants
resemble atomic constant terms combinators	 of typed combinatory logic
A constant c

specied as c

 A  B  A		 can be identied with the
combinator k
A B
of the type A BA	 A constant c

such that c

 A

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B  C		  A B	 A C		 corresponds to the combinator s
A B C
of the type A B C		  A B	 A C		 The proof variables
may be regarded as term variables of combinatory logic the operation 
as the application of terms In general an LP
formula t  F can be read as
a combinatory term t of the type F  Typed combinatory logic CL

thus
corresponds to a fragment of LP consisting only of formulas of the sort t F
where t contains no operations other than  and F is a formula built from
the propositional letters by  only
There is no restriction on the choice of a constant c in R within a given
derivation In particular R allows introducing a formula c Ac	 or specifying
a constant several times as a proof of dierent axioms from A  A
Remark   The following constructive necessitation rule is admissible in
LP
 F   p F for some proof polynomial p
In fact this proof polynomial p is a formal blueprint of a derivation of F in
LP
Remark  The operations  and  are present for single conclusion as
well as on multiple conclusion proof systems On the other hand  is an
operation for multiple conclusion proof systems only Indeed by A we have
s F   t G st	 F   st	 G thus s t proves dierent formulas The
dierences between single conclusion and multiple conclusion proof systems
are mostly cosmetic Usual proof systems Hilbert or Gentzen style	 may be
considered as single conclusion if one assumes that a proof derives only the
end formula sequent	 of a proof tree On the other hand the same systems
may be regarded as multiple conclusion by assuming that a proof derives all
formulas assigned to the nodes of the proof tree
No single operator t   in LP is a normal modality since none of them
satises the property t  PQ	  t P  t Q	 This makes LP essentially
dierent from numerous polymodal logics eg the dynamic logic of programs
 	 where the modality is upgraded by some additional features In turn
in the Logic of Proofs the modality is decomposed into a family of proof
polynomials
Theorem    	 LP is sound and complete with respect to the natu 
ral provability semantics in a given consistent formal theory containing su 
cient amount of arithmetic	 LP is decidable and admits normalization of both
Gentzen and natural style derivations	
 Realization of modal and intuitionistic logics
It is easy to see that the forgetful projection of LP is correct with respect to
S  Let F
o
be the result of substituting  X for all occurrences of t X in F 

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and 
o
 fF
o
j F 	 g for any set  of LP
formulas
Lemma   If LP  F  then S   F
o
	
In fact the converse also holds LP suces to realize any theorem of S 
Denition   By an LP
realization of a modal formula F we mean an as

signment of proof polynomials to all occurrences of the modality in F  Let
F
r
be the image of F under a realization r A realization r is normal if all
negative occurrences of   are realized by proof variables
Theorem   If S   F  then LP  F
r
for some normal realization r	
Example    S    A   B	   A B	
In LP the corresponding derivation is
  c  A BA B		 by R
 x A c  x	  BA B	 from   by A
 x A y Bc x  y	 A B		 from  by A and propositional logic
 x A y B  c  x  y	  A B		 from  by propositional logic
Example   S    A B	  AB	
In LP the corresponding derivation is
  a  A A B	 b  B  A B	 by R
 x A ax	  AB	 y B  by	  AB	 from   by A
 ax	  AB	 axby	 AB	 by	  AB	 axby	 AB	 by A
 x A y B	 axby	 AB	 from  by propositional logic
Remark   S  is nothing but a lazy version of LP that does not distinguish
between the proof polynomials Each theorem of S  admits a decoding via LP
as a statement about specic proofs The language of LP is more rich than
that of S  In particular S  theorems admit essentially dierent realizations
in LP For example consider two theorems of LP having the same modal
projection
x Fy F  x y	 F and x Fx F  x F
The former of these formulas is a meaningful specication of the operation
 In a contrast the latter one is a trivial tautology
A recipe for using S  as a provability logic could be the following nd a
proof of F in S  and then run a realization algorithm to recover the provability
meaning of F 
Denition   Let gk F 	 denote a translation of an intuitionistic formula F
into the plain modal language that puts the prex   in front of all subformulas
in F Godel Kolmogorov translation	 Under mtF 	 we understand the trans

lation that prexes with  only atoms and implications in F McKinsey Tarski
translation	 A propositional formula F is GK realizable MT realizable	 if

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there exists a normal realization r such that gk F 	
r
mtF 	
r
	 is derivable in
LP
Theorem  	 Realization of intuitionistic logic	 For any Int formula F
	 Int  F 
 F is GK realizable
	 Int  F 
 F is MT realizable
Note that GK
realizability may be regarded as a formalization of the Kol

mogorov calculus of problems from    by reading problem solutions as
proofs This realizability gives a plausible formalization of Kolmogorovs
calculus of problems    Propositional atoms are interpreted as atomic prob 
lems namely statements of the sort t  S meaning t is a proof of S Intu

itionistic connectives are given precise meaning according to   
Example  
 Let S T be propositional letters Consider the formula
F  S  T 	  ST 	
obviously provable in Int The corresponding translations of this formula to
the modal language are in both cases the outermost  s are suppressed for
briey	
mtF 	    S  T 	    S T 	
gk F 	     S   T 	    S T 	
We will present normal realizations in LP for each of mtF 	 and gk F 	
The following is a derivation in LP with a simultaneous construction of a
normal realization of mtF 	
  x S  x Sy T 	 by classical logic 
 a  x S  x Sy T 	 by necessitation rule  Note that here a
is a product of some axiom constants with obvious specications 
 z  x S	 az	  x Sy T 	 from  by A 
 y T  x Sy T 	 axiom of propositional logic A 
 b  y T  x Sy T 	 from  by axiom necessitation R 
 y y T  by	  x Sy T 	 from  by A 
 y T y y T  axiom A 
 y T  by	  x Sy T 	 from   by classical logic 
 z  x S	y T 	 az  by	  x Sy T 	 from   by A
In the case of gk F 	 the realization is constructed along the following deriva

tion in LP
  x S  x Sy T 	 by classical logic 
 z  x S	 x S axiom A 
 z  x S	 x Sy T 	 from    
 y T  x Sy T 	 axiom of propositional logic A 
 z  x S	y T 	 x Sy T 	 from   by classical logic 

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 c H when H is from  by necessitation rule  Here c is a ground
proof polynomial easily recoverable from the derivation of 
 u  z  x S	y T 	 cu	  x Sy T 	 from  by A
 Realization of modal  calculus
Roughly speaking LP is an advanced system of combinatory logic that ac

commodates not only the application operation but also proof checker
and choice These operations subsume the simply typed  
calculus together
with the modal logic S  and thus the entire modal  
calculus   	 In
particular LP creates an environment where modality and  
terms are ob

jects of the same nature namely proof polynomials Another way to look at
it modal logic is a forgetful projection of a combinatory logic with dependent
types enriched by the operations proof checker and choice
Such uniform understanding of modalities and  
terms as proof polynomi

als is more exible than the usual modal  
calculus In particular there is
no modal  
term tx	 such that x A tx	  A whereas there is a proof
polynomial x proof checker	 in LP such that x Ax x A holds
The realization of S  in LP provides a fresh look at modal logic and its
applications in general Proof polynomials reveal the dynamic character of
modality It raises the general question of nding explicit counterparts to all
major modal logics Such areas as modal  
calculi  
calculi with types de

pending on terms non
deterministic  
calculi etc could benet from viewing
their semantics as proof polynomials delivered by LP
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